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Political and Security Trends in the Arab World and the Middle East
The conference and its objectives 
On 19-20 January 2012, in collaboration with the International  
Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Academic Outreach  
Program of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) hosted 
a two-day conference on the Middle East. The event, conducted under 
the Chatham House rule, had three objectives: to improve the partici-
pants’ understanding of the region’s domestic and foreign challenges, 
to explore its future prospects and to discuss related implications  
for Canada. 
The expert panels were organised around several modules that  
examined:
•	 politics and security in Egypt,




•	 political violence and terrorism,
•	 the future of political Islam,
•	 evolving regional geopolitics, and
•	 implications for Canada and the United States. 
The conference welcomed a diverse range of participants and invited 
leading experts from Canada, Europe, the Middle East and the United 
States. It addressed a selection of key themes and set a background 
for a continuing dialogue on salient ones. This report summarizes the 
main ideas presented by experts and discussed amongst participants 
during the course of the event. It should also be noted that the views, 
ideas and concepts in this report do not reflect official positions of 
CSIS and are offered as a means of supporting an ongoing discussion 
of the political turmoil that has changed the Middle East since the 
beginning of 2011.
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Executive Summary
Change, continuity and uncertainty
The initial excitement that followed the “Arab awakening” in early 2011 
has gradually waned in the face of re-emerging sectarian tensions, 
geopolitical games, unmet expectations, and uncertainty about the 
future of new leaders and about untested democratic processes.  
A few countries have successfully toppled authoritarian regimes 
(Tunisia, Egypt and Libya). Some are still locked in continuing and 
uncertain struggles (Syria, Yemen and Bahrain), while others remain 
more or less entrenched in the status quo (like Saudi Arabia).
The revolts have left the region torn, struggling with the promises 
and uncertainties of reform, the challenges of building new political 
systems, resilient authoritarian structures and persistent violence. 
These revolts have also shown that political legitimacy is tied to 
popular will, as well as to the ability of governments to address 
grievances and human indignities. As a result, daunting challenges 
now face political Islam, which can re-write its own history and that  
of the countries where it will assume power.
This new and still fluid state of affairs presents several volatile 
implications. In addition to re-opening ancient fault lines and reviving 
old rivalries, the revolts have re-ignited regional power plays, 
especially among Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and are 
forcing external powers like the United States, Russia and China to 
re-think their approach in the region. Despite the inevitable surprises 
ahead, we can expect profound and long-lasting instability as new 
elites attempt to draft and negotiate new social contracts and to build 
a new political order. 
It is difficult for students of the region to make sense of recent events 
given their complex and dynamic nature. To understand the upheavals 
of the past year, we can study the evolution of the regional political 
order, the nature of the threat environment, and regional geopolitics  
by asking three questions: 
•	 What has changed? 
•	 What has not changed?
•	 Which factors or trends remain uncertain and ambiguous?
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Change
Political order in Middle Eastern and North Africa is undergoing 
important transformations. In this remarkable period in the history of 
the Arab world, the region’s population is experiencing a true process 
of national self-determination for the first time. Power vacuums and 
shifting dynamics have led to the emergence of new political actors, 
the most prominent of whom are representatives of political Islam like 
Al Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, 
it is feared that the Islamists’ popularity will not offset their lack of 
strategic depth and practice of politics as they attempt to manage the 
many serious practical challenges expected to confront the region in 
the future.
At the same time, the internal balance of power between the old and 
new political systems has changed as a consequence of the popular 
uprisings. In Bahrain, for example, the regime’s successful repression 
of the street protests has led to a rise in the fortunes of the hard-line 
faction, at the expense of the reformists. 
The Arab awakening has also resulted in important changes in the 
regional threat environment. In particular, difficult post-revolutionary 
transitions raise a number of security concerns. Ongoing instability 
in post-Qaddafi Libya for instance has had and will continue to have 
a number of repercussions for regional security, including weapons 
seeping out of the country and into the hands of terrorist or criminal 
networks throughout North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East. 
The Arab revolts, moreover, have led to a shift in regional power 
dynamics, even though many issues remain unsettled. Egypt is 
gradually re-assuming its traditional leadership role, whereas Iran has 
seen its influence diminish. Qatar, for its part, has taken advantage of 
the regional turmoil to continue its rise as a regional power centre. 
Continuity
An important common thread throughout the conference was the 
assessment that prominent actors who dominated the old political 
order have been fighting hard since early 2011 to protect the status 
quo. Their considerable political and economic stakes are matched  
by their resilience and keen defence of the old structures. 
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Three categories of such actors exist. Countries like Saudi Arabia are 
positioning themselves as the leading defenders of the existing order. 
In countries that are experiencing or have experienced revolutions 
such as Yemen and Egypt, once powerful actors are fighting fiercely to 
protect their interests. Finally, countries like Moroco and Algeria have 
not been swept up by massive protests and should be studied in order 
to understand which factors are responsible for continued stability. 
Despite the massive upheavals caused by the Arab revolts, the threat 
environment and regional geopolitics have also been marked by 
important continuities. Even though Al Qaeda’s obituary has been 
written several times before, the transnational movement remains far 
from irrelevant and many of its regional networks continue to pose a 
significant threat to Western interests. 
In terms of regional geopolitics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
remains a festering wound for many in the region. According to many 
conference participants, a solution is unlikely in 2012. Furthermore, 
sectarian tensions have not played a determining role in shaping the 
Arab awakening, but they represent an important regional fault line 
(for example in Bahrain).
Uncertainty 
The conference explored a number of factors and trends that will 
determine part of the emerging political order, threat environment and 
geopolitics of the Arab world, Its whose evolution remains, however, 
uncertain. Of serious concern are the unpredictable consequences 
associated with unfulfilled expectations after the revolutionary 
euphoria fades. Moreover, even though a variety of new actors have 
appeared on the political scene, in many cases their intentions are 
poorly understood.
The regional threat environment is also filled with ambiguities. What 
are the prospects for Al Qaeda? Will its rhetoric of violent change 
and rejectionism be replaced by a new message of peaceful change 
and pluralism, or will the network succeed in adapting itself? Might it 
provide a rallying point for disenfranchised youth whose expectations 
of the democratic transition remain unmet? Will Al Qaeda continue to 
encourage recruits in the West to carry out attacks “at home”, that is, 
in the Middle East and North Africa? 
Meanwhile, instability in Syria, Libya, Iraq and perhaps Jordan should 
be monitored carefully to prevent the establishment of ungoverned 
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territories. Today’s terrorist entities are now beginning to outlive their 
Cold War counterparts and follow their own path. Al Qaeda was 
founded in 1988 but it waited until 1998 to perpetrate its first attacks. 
In comparison, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which was 
been created in 2009 and today has possibly outgrown the parent 
organisation in capabilities and designs, rose to prominence with 
spectacular speed. AQAP’s strength resides in its resourcefulness 
and originality. The group’s possible future use of surgically implanted 
improvised explosive devices (SIIEDs) was raised during the 
conference.
Many aspects of regional geopolitics, such as the evolution of the 
business environment, are also uncertain. The future of US influence 
is a fundamental question to which there is no unanimous answer. In 
the words of one speaker, it is a “mixed bag”: in some respects the 
US has benefitted from the Arab revolts, whereas it has not in others. 
Throughout the conference, a number of speakers argued that US 
influence in the region was probably in decline prior to 2011. Whether 
this decline will continue, accelerate or be reversed in the future 
remains an open question. 
Implications for Canada  
The Arab awakening will inevitably have an impact on Canada and 
its interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Canada may have 
a limited ability to influence outcomes in the region, but it will face a 
number of challenges as it learns how to navigate the new regional 
political and social orders. 
In the short term, the region will be preoccupied with its domestic chal-
lenges. There is a very strong possibility that there will be increased 
instability and extremism emanating from the region, which could have 
a direct impact on Canadian interests in a number of ways. Jihadist 
networks that benefit from instability in such countries as Yemen and 
Syria, for instance, could reach out increasingly to Canadian citizens. 
At the same time, the security of some of Canada’s allies and other 
international partners has been negatively affected by the upheavals 
in the region. These effects include the risk of prolonged instability 
in countries struggling with a civil war or difficult transitions. In this 
context, Canada may receive bilateral and multilateral demands to 
support new initiatives and to improve existing collaboration in order to 
deal with the full and lasting implications of a new Arab political reality. 
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Introduction
The initial excitement that followed the “Arab awakening” in early 2011 
has gradually waned in the face of re-emerging sectarian tensions, 
geopolitical games, unmet expectations, and uncertainty about the 
future of new leaderships and about untested democratic processes. 
The revolts have left the region torn, struggling with the promises 
and uncertainties of reform, the challenges of building new political 
systems, resilient authoritarian structures, and persistent violence. 
In the meantime, political turmoil has shaken what was once an 
unshakeable regional order. A few countries have successfully toppled 
old regimes (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya). Others are still locked in 
continuing and uncertain struggles (Syria, Yemen and Bahrain), while 
the rest remain more or less solidly entrenched in the status quo.
This new and still fluid state of affairs has a number of unexpected 
implications. In addition to re-opening ancient fault lines and reviving 
old rivalries, the revolts have re-ignited regional power plays, 
especially among Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and are 
forcing external powers like the United States, Russia and China 
to reconsider their approach in the region. We can expect profound 
and long-lasting instability as new elites emerge and negotiate with 
existing ones in order to draft new social contracts and build a new 
political order. 
It is thus very difficult for observers of the Middle East to make sense 
of ongoing events given their complex and dynamic nature. To 
understand the recent political transformation and its consequences, 
we can examine the evolution of the regional political order, the nature 
of the threat environment, as well as regional geopolitics by asking the 
three questions below.
•	 What has changed? 
Some emerging new actors and trends should be the focus of 
increased attention. Change may well be manifesting itself in 
unexpected areas and ways. 
•	 What has not changed?
This central question can easily be overlooked. By comparing 
elements that have changed with those that have not, a selection 
bias can be avoided when looking at the region as a whole. It is 
often assumed too quickly that a variable – for example the status 
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of an actor, a set of relationships – has changed when in fact it 
has not. 
•	 Which factors are uncertain and ambiguous?
These factors determine the burgeoning political order and 
the threat environment, but it is currently impossible to assess 
the direction they will take. Given the high level of uncertainty 
surrounding these variables, we can attempt to understand 
the context in which these factors operate, using the following 
questions: how have the rules of the game changed, how have 
the actors themselves changed, and how has the regional and 
international context evolved?
The Arab spring and change 
Evolution of the political order
Emergence of a true process of national self-determination
According to one speaker, we are currently witnessing one of the most 
significant periods in the history of the Arab world. For the first time 
in its history, the region is undergoing a true process of national self-
determination whereby people can begin to define their political reality. 
This major historical development has five key features:
•	 The birth of the modern Arab citizen: for the first time, Arabs 
believe that they have power and rights, as well as the  
collective opportunity to define their own societies and  
governments. This process is the beginning of the “real 
consent of the governed.”  In what direction this will evolve 
remains unclear, but what is notable at this stage is that the 
process has been initiated. 
•	 The birth of politics: protest through peaceful means has  
occurred sporadically in the past, but never to the extent that 
it does now. As the constitutional process takes its course, 
this trend will only intensify. 
•	 The drafting of a new social contract: this is driven by 
demand for social justice. This demand, however, often 
expressed in general terms, has yet to be translated into 
concrete action in terms of policy.
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•	 The establishment of accountability mechanisms entrenching 
political legitimacy: this is a first in the Arab world, which has 
never seen true legitimacy anchored in accountability. 
•	 The redefinition of civil-military relations: this may be the 
single most important dynamic that will define developments 
in the years ahead. 
If these five dynamics continue, a lasting process of national self- 
determination will take its course, leading to the ultimate prize  
which has eluded the Arab world since the First World War: modern 
sovereignty rooted in the population’s well-being. These historical 
developments also mean that for the first time in the Arab world, 
political and social trends may converge and gradually lead to states 
which reflect the will of the majority while protecting the rights of their 
minorities. 
The Arab revolts have also changed at every level how power is exer-
cised and configured. As was discussed throughout the conference, 
many new actors are revealing themselves. Most were already pres-
ent in society but had largely been invisible until now. These actors 
include the Salafis and ultra-conservatives, the revolutionary youth 
and many others. It is useful to ask what other important actors still 
remain in the shadows and have yet to come forward.  
We must keep in mind the magnitude of the obstacles to overcome in 
the years ahead, especially in countries that face tremendous chal-
lenges stemming for example from insecurity and poor infrastructure. 
Despite these obstacles, we are witnessing four distinct transitions 
that historically have generally occurred separately in other countries:
•	 the “awakening” can be construed as the “last anti-colonial 
struggle” in the Arab world against political systems that are 
direct or indirect remnants of colonial rule;
•	 this struggle is a battle as much for democracy as for social 
justice;
•	 the people wish to participate in the definition of national 
values and policy; and
•	 the revolts represent a struggle for equitable and sustainable 
economic growth.
Political and Security Trends in the Arab World and the Middle East
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This complex set of transitions took one to two centuries to complete 
in most Western countries. According to one speaker, it is therefore 
necessary to give the Arab people space and time to allow them to 
define their own priorities and reconfigure their political, economic and 
social systems in a manner that is in keeping with their own values 
and norms. 
In short, the new legitimacy and accountability arising throughout  
the region are primarily driven by the same two factors that drove  
Mohammed Bouazizi, a fruit cart seller humiliated by the Tunisian 
police, to immolation in December 2010. First, there are the material 
grievances, that is, the people’s aspiration to greater wealth and  
security. Second, there are the intangible indignities, that is, the  
repeated, everyday humiliations suffered by most citizens. 
Emergence of new actors
Bahrain. It is important to put recent developments in the Middle East 
in their proper historical context. The case of Bahrain, in particular,  
illustrates how the actors who led the popular protests in that country 
in 2011 did not spring from a vacuum but rather from a long-standing 
political culture of opposition and protests. To varying degrees, this 
has been the case throughout the region, although not amongst  
Bahrain’s immediate neighbours.
In Bahrain, riots have been a regular feature of politics since the 
1930s and the creation of the local oil industry, giving substance to a 
local adage that there is an intifada every decade in the island state. 
Bahrain in this sense differs from its neighbours: it features an old and 
well-organised opposition. At the level of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC, which represents the oil-rich Arab monarchies of the Persian 
Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates), in fact, the only active political parties are found in Bahrain 
(technically, parties are not allowed there, but political societies are). 
Despite the long historical roots of political opposition, the 2011 protests 
stood out because they were part of significant shifts shaking up the 
national political scene. Bahrain has been a liberalised autocracy 
since 2002, when organised societies, unions and civil society asso-
ciations became legal. Parliament, however, has very little authority as 
all of its decisions are subject to veto by the government. As a result, 
when parliament was reinstated in 2002 after having been suspended, 
the major political associations decided not to participate, including  
Al-Wefaq, the largest Shi’ite opposition party (the majority of the  
population are Shi’ites, while the royal family is Sunni). Al-Wefaq  
argued that the constitution gave too much power to unelected bodies. 
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In 2006, Al-Wefaq decided to participate in a new round of elections, 
leading to its co-optation by the regime and the fragmentation of the 
opposition, since some of its members decided to break with Al-Wefaq 
and create Al-Haq, another, more radical opposition party. Al-Haq 
sought to internationalise the Bahraini crisis by submitting to the 
United Nations a petition demanding more powers for parliament.
Egypt. Islamists throughout the Middle East are following closely 
their Egyptian counterparts. If the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is 
successful, this will pave the way for other groups to follow suit. What 
happens in this country is of critical importance since history demon-
strates that the rest of the Arab world tends to follow Egyptian political 
developments (note the emergence of constitutionalism in the 1940s 
and 1950s and the dominance of pan-Arabism and nationalism in the 
1950s and 1960s.)  
Prior to the Egyptian revolution of 2011, there were three key Islamist 
groups in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi movement and 
the ex-jihadists who, in many cases, had abandoned violence. Under 
President Hosni Mubarak, the Brothers and the Salafis were the targets 
of severe repression. Salafi missionary work and social activism were 
consistently undermined by the regime. 
When street protests erupted in Cairo in January 2011, the Muslim 
Brotherhood initially indicated that it would not participate, although 
instructions were issued to its members stating that those who wished 
to go to Tahrir Square could do so. On 28 January 2011, as the situation 
intensified, the Brotherhood decided to participate directly in the  
growing protest movement. By 2 February, members of the Brother- 
hood, some Salafis, and ex-jihadists were at the front line of the 
popular uprising.  
Following Mubarak’s fall on 11 February, the political dynamic shifted 
as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over. The 
massive state security apparatus used to control and repress the 
Islamists had thus collapsed. For each of the three main groups, this 
new state of affairs had a number of implications. 
Before the uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood had some experience 
in domestic and foreign politics through its work with other political 
movements like student unions. This experience was rapidly put into 
practice as the Brotherhood demonstrated its savvy campaigning 
skills during the parliamentary elections of late 2011 and early 2012. 
Even if its history had somewhat prepared the movement to engage 
actively in politics, the Brotherhood generally lacks the experience and 
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strategic depth to face the region’s thorny issues. Its performance as a 
political actor remains unpredictable. 
The rise of the Salafists surprised a number of observers. The Salafists 
formed a coalition of five parties: Noor, the largest, as well as one  
mid-sized and three smaller parties. Their success was based in large 
part on their ability to provide social services while using religious 
symbolism, as well as on their existing organisational and administra-
tive structures. Noor, like the Brotherhood, had been engaged in  
significant welfare activities, such as providing free healthcare, 
throughout the country. The importance of such social services  
became obvious:  maps showed that Islamist parties garnered the 
most support in areas where they had been operating for a longer 
time. Even though Noor and other Salafist movements had been 
mainly apolitical before 2011, their strong organisational structures 
greatly facilitated their mobilisation once the political arena opened up. 
For their part, the former jihadists focussed on moving away from 
violence and joining the political process. Many of their leaders, 
previously known for their stridently anti-democratic gestures, quickly 
formed political coalitions. This potential transition to the mainstream 
raised a number of complex questions. Some of the group leaders 
had criminal records, while many amongst the grassroots members 
were not enthusiastic about joining the political process. Nevertheless, 
having renounced violence, the leaders of the ex-jihadist movement 
have continued  to enhance their political legitimacy. 
It is in this context that Islamist groups affiliated with the Brotherhood 
and the Salafists won over two-thirds of the seats in the first parlia-
mentary elections since the fall of President Mubarak. The Brotherhood 
is now driven mostly by two distinct forces: an internal power struggle 
and its tense relationship with the ruling SCAF. The upcoming con-
frontation between the Brotherhood and the SCAF will be about the 
future constitution of Egypt. Because of their two-thirds majority, the 
Islamists will exert significant influence over the constitutional assem-
bly responsible for drafting the constitution in 2012. The Brotherhood 
is likely to seek to limit the powers of the military through the adoption 
of specific constitutional provisions. 
The Salafists have generally sought to convey three main messages: 
they are the most religious; they are in the process of becoming 
more moderate; and they do not wish to  clash with the military but 
instead wish to be accommodating. Their main objective is to make 
Islamic law, or shari’a, the only (as opposed to the principal) source of 
national legislation, although they themselves recognise that it will be 
difficult. An important challenge for the Salafists is to avoid divisions 
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and defections. For example, although early during the uprising the 
Salafist leaders ordered their followers not to join protesters on Tahrir 
Square, many in the middle ranks and grassroots were defiant and  
did so anyway. The fragmentation pattern will continue, as younger 
members are generally more inclusive and tolerant than their leaders. 
Tunisia. Al-Nahda, an Islamist party banned under the government 
of Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali, has emerged as the dominant actor of the 
new political order in Tunisia. Nahda took advantage of the fragmen-
tation of the other opposition parties, especially the leftist parties, to 
become the most powerful party after the elections for a constituent 
assembly on 23 October 2011. Nahda then agreed to an alliance with 
two small, left-leaning parties: the Congress for the Republic (CPR) 
and Takkatol. The government formed on 22 December concentrated 
power in the hands of the Nahda Prime Minister however and gave 
little power to its coalition allies. As a result, civil society organisations 
have continued to put pressure on Nahda, fearing it may resort to a 
hegemonic strategy as Ben Ali did in the past. 
In general, the Tunisian revolution has provided Nahda with an  
opportunity to build itself from the ground up. Its strategy and message 
have been to present its members as the victims of Ben Ali and not 
as politicians, promising Tunisians both a break from the old regime 
and reconciliation. It has also promised social justice and order to a 
population that wants above all stability and an end to chaos. Nahda 
has also adopted a targeted and cautious strategy in order to juggle 
the many competing demands during the transition. Those demands 
range from liberalising Tunisia’s economic and foreign policies to 
promoting social justice and public morals. In spite of this, there are 
growing suspicions in many quarters about the nature of its Islamist 
agenda, especially in light of worrisome declarations made by its 
representatives. 
Youth and the use of social media. Two key features of the protests 
that have been common across the Middle East are the emergence 
of youth movements as central political actors and their use of social 
media to further their cause. In Egypt, 30 percent of the population is 
between 15 and 35 years of age, illustrating their  importance in the 
new regional politics. 
 
Specific conditions under the Mubarak regime set the stage for the 
emergence of youth social groups. The old system allowed such 
groups as long as they did not challenge the government. The main 
political parties did not have the channels required to include these 
nascent movements, so they developed autonomously. Social groups 
in Egypt therefore first rose to the surface as political and ideological 
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movements. Millions of young people descended onto the streets in 
support of the Palestinian cause in 2002 and in opposition to the war 
in Iraq in 2003.  
Social and youth movements in Egypt have a number of characteris-
tics. Created in a climate of repression, they had no choice but to  
mobilise using unofficial means and without leadership structures. 
There is considerable flexibility in the phenomenon, as young activists 
readily jump from one group, or cause, to another. Youth activists 
have also the ability to move between the virtual and real worlds,  
perhaps explaining in part the general lack of ideology and homo-
geneity amongst them. Activists are usually not interested in being  
categorised as secular or religious; they seek instead a political  
system based on democracy. 
A number of youth groups have appeared in Egypt in the past years. 
Most played, to varying degrees, important roles in the events of 
January and February 2011. Kefaya (“enough” in Arabic) has been the 
main protest group since 2005. Another prominent group is the Sixth 
of April Movement. Created initially as a Facebook opposition group in 
2008, it consists primarily of youth who had been members of banned 
groups like Kefaya and Ghad, a liberal opposition party, as well as 
independents. The Sixth of April has however been divided along  
various lines, between liberals and nationalists, and between those 
who support or those who oppose participation in elections. Its  
membership is unknown and has been estimated at 2000 to 5000. 
Another prominent Facebook group is known as the “We are all 
Khaled Saeed” movement, named after a young man beaten to death 
by the police in Alexandria in 2010. This group had already attracted 
350,000 members by 25 January 2011, and has attracted more than 
two million since. Finally, the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood 
has been an important player amongst youth movements, as it split 
from the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution. It did not perform 
well in the parliamentary elections and has since focussed on street 
activism, often in cooperation with other groups. 
The importance of social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
should not be underestimated. There are fifteen million Internet users 
in Egypt, a significant number that allowed young people to call for 
revolution through social networking. The lack of hierarchical organisa-
tion amongst social and youth actors further encouraged the use of 
social networks to improve coordination and to decide on common 
objectives. 
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The use of new technology has provided youth movements with a 
number of advantages. Social media are affordable and create a 
“counter public sphere” to challenge ideas and information emanating 
from the establishment. They also raise awareness amongst youth, 
contribute to the creation of different streams of activism, and are a 
key centre of democratic political experience. 
Despite their growing importance, youth movements face a number 
of important challenges. They have been united against President 
Mubarak’s government but have not been able to agree on a common 
platform as to what should replace it. Many youth groups also reject 
the growing relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
army, in part because they fear that it could lead to their own  
marginalisation.  
Existing actors growing in status and changing: political Islam
One of the most important shifts since the beginning of the Arab 
revolts has been the rise to prominence of political Islam. According 
to a speaker, in the next five years, leading mainstream Islamist 
movements will gain significant influence in pivotal states of the 
Middle East, including in Egypt, Libya and Morocco. Making sense  
of their new position remains a challenge which the presenter 
explained using five points.
 
First, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the social composi-
tion of Islamist parties is shifting towards pragmatic elements and 
away from more conservative factions. The latter is a generational 
shift, as the younger technocrats and professionals who play an  
increasingly prominent role tend to be more open-minded and reformist.  
Although ultra-conservative factions still exercise considerable influence 
within mainstream Islamist movements, they are a dwindling minority.  
In the next five years, it is expected that modern technocrats with a 
commitment to various forms of pluralism will gain further influence 
and assume more leadership positions within their movements.
Second, generalisations about the world views of Islamist  
movements should be avoided. That being said, most mainstream 
Islamists may be starting to accept the rules of politics and the idea  
of citizenship. They accept that the will of the people, not God’s  
authority, is what defines the political landscape. This change is a  
major development: leading Islamist movements that fully participate 
in the political process today viewed democratic involvement as a sin 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This evolution demonstrates how political 
engagement changes individuals and groups: Islamists today attempt 
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to recruit followers, appeal to specific constituencies, and convey a 
message of moderation and pluralism.
These Islamists make it very clear that they will not be reckless or  
make unilateral decisions that would violate societal consensus. They 
also understand that they obtained electoral majorities not because  
they want to establish imamates, but because they are seen as more 
pragmatic than the liberals, often perceived as elitist, and because 
people want to eliminate the existing corrupt and authoritarian order. 
They also increasingly recognise that they must face checks  
and balances. 
This situation differs fundamentally from the situation that existed in 
Iran in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is therefore inappropriate to 
analyse the current developments through the Iranian lens. Today’s 
emerging Islamists are becoming more aware of varying constituencies 
and wide-ranging interests in their own societies and seek to solidify 
and expand their social bases. In the near future, we will certainly 
witness intense battles over the nature of new constitutions, but these 
struggles will reflect a sense of pluralism in Arab societies to which 
most mainstream Islamist movements are beginning to subscribe.
Third, the speaker indicated that Islamist attitudes towards the 
West will not change overnight and will remain negative. The bitter 
history between Western powers and Arab societies will take many 
years to overcome. Nevertheless, perceptions are evolving. Even  
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has been indirectly calling on the  
West to intervene in Syria and remove the government of  
President Al-Assad. Such an appeal would have been sacrilegious  
as recently as in 2010. At the same time, while it criticises the US  
for failing to intervene in Syria, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood  
continues to call on the US to adopt a balanced approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to favour Arab popular aspirations as 
opposed to the interests of Arab autocrats. 
The Palestinian conflict will likely remain a touchy subject and will 
continue to represent the most difficult challenge to improved relations 
between the two sides. Because the conflict pertains to a fundamental 
question of identity, until a Palestinian state is established, it will  
continue to polarise Muslims and the West. However, even on the 
question of Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood has said that it will abide 
by the spirit of the Camp David Accords (the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel) as long as Israel also does. It insists that it will not 
make any impulsive unilateral decisions that could bring about any 
instability in the region. Even the leaders of Hamas are now openly 
talking about popular protests instead of armed uprisings, possibly 
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because the Brothers in Egypt have impressed upon their Hamas 
counterparts the need to behave differently.
A fourth feature of rising Islamist movements is their lack of a  
uniform economic program. Indeed, one of their major failures so 
far has been their inability to develop a socio-economic blueprint that 
goes beyond the premise that “Islam is good for business.” There has 
been much rhetoric about social justice, but ultimately Islamists are 
members of the working class and the bourgeoisie. Many are prosper-
ous businesspeople and are more comfortable with a liberal economic 
model than a collectivist one. A major economic shift is therefore 
unlikely. 
Finally, although they have come a long way in recent decades, the  
Islamists are not born-again democrats. Their rhetoric and plans 
remain rooted in stiff expressions of ideology that they have been  
unable or unwilling to shed (for example, censorship, repressive  
interpretation of freedom of speech, and women’s rights). 
Islamist fortunes will certainly ebb and flow depending on whether 
they live up to their promises. What can be expected is that they will 
likely avoid reckless decisions that would cost them political gains at 
home because they are learning to place interest above ideology. In 
other words, they are emerging as interest-driven agents instead of 
agents primarily motivated by ideology. 
The rise of Islamist parties throughout the Middle East will allow  
observers to test some of the theories that political scientists have  
put forward about religious social movements and their ability and 
willingness to grow into legitimate political movements. There exists a 
general consensus amongst humanities and social science scholars that 
ideological or religious movements are almost incapable of changing 
from rigid entities into pragmatic movements committed to pluralism. 
That may change.
One speaker proposed three elements with which social and political 
scientists often back this claim. First, the case studies of Iran, Sudan 
and Saudi Arabia show that, when Islamist movements take power, 
they try to export their revolution and cannot transform themselves 
into interest-driven parties. Second, experts tend to study the rhetoric 
and manifestos of absolutist and extremist movements that do not 
subscribe to any form of pluralism (like Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran 
and major ideologues like Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb). Third, 
basing themselves on the myth that most extremists and terrorists are 
offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, scholars tend to draw a straight 
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line between the Brotherhood and various local and international 
jihadist movements. 
The Iranian revolution is an important example of how Islamists can 
behave once they take power. Once Ayatollah Khomeini gained 
power, he destroyed competing social groups and sought to export the 
Islamic revolution to other countries. On the other hand, in Turkey and 
throughout the Arab world, most Islamists renounced violence and 
worked hard for more than four decades to join the political process in 
order to obtain a legal status, even if they were persecuted in almost 
every single country in the region. 
The case of Iran’s revolution therefore does not provide a useful 
comparison to understand the current “Islamist moment.” In the Arab 
world and Turkey, Islamist movements have focussed since the 1960s 
on the expansion of their social base and the construction of extensive 
welfare networks along with built-in political machines in order to sur-
vive the harsh tactics that secular regimes used against them. Starting 
in the 1970s, their priorities were first to ensure their survival, second 
to consolidate and expand, but not to promote revolutionary ideals. 
The second piece of evidence used by social scientists against Islamists 
has been the inflated rhetoric and manifestos by the likes of Hassan 
Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Hamas and Hizballah. A variety of rigid and 
absolutist manifestos certainly exist. Yet this is to be expected from 
anti-colonial movements which have been in the eye of the storm 
since they were formed in the 1920s. Many of them therefore have an 
ingrained sense of persecution and victimization, an us-versus-them 
mentality. Since the late 1940s, political Islam has been targeted or 
condemned by both pro-western Arab leaders and the West, leaving 
deep scars and a bitter legacy that will take decades to overcome.
Third, because scholars tend to draw a straight line between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and local and international jihadists, the dominant 
narrative in the social sciences does not take into account the major 
ideological break which occurred in the 1960s. At that time, the  
underground radical wing of the Islamist movement almost succeeded 
in devouring the mainstream wing. Radical trends spawned in Egyptian 
prisons from Qutb’s writings shook the foundations of the Islamist 
movement. 
The Qutbists faced stiff resistance from mainstream elements in 
Egypt. The latter argued that they were preachers and not judges, 
opposing the revolutionary road that Qutb wanted the movement to 
follow.  Although Qutbists in the late 1950s and early 1960s represented 
the most serious threat to the mainstream, they ultimately failed to 
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gain a major foothold within the Islamist movement. That being said, 
Qutb’s execution in the late 1960s did empower the radical wing and 
provide it with inspiration and ideological ammunition. 
In light of such developments, the 1970s marked the climax of the 
radical wing within the Islamist movement. Qutbists could have suc-
ceeded in overpowering the mainstream during this decade. They did 
develop a major presence in universities and abroad. The radicals, 
who were as much against the existing political order in Arab societies 
as they were against mainstream Islamist movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, ultimately failed to gain the upper hand. Many Islamists 
now look back to the 1970s as a golden age. Some also acknowledge 
that the killing of Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981 marked 
the beginning of the decline of the radical wing.
From the 1980s on, the balance of power shifted dramatically, to the 
detriment of  radical jihadists because of their violent tactics. Even the 
Muslim public realised that jihadism would not provide a constructive 
vision for Arab Muslim societies. Today many think that the Egyptians 
and the Algerians were able to win a war in the 1990s against jihadists, 
but this view tends to neglect the fact that the jihadists were unable to 
build potent social movements. Many Arabs chose mainstream politi-
cal Islam, which since the early 1970s had received more support than 
the radicals by building and supporting extensive social networks. It is 
still too early, however, to make any definitive statement about how 
Islamists will govern as they gradually assume power, or whether  
governance will transform them from ideologically-motivated movements 
into interest-driven mainstream political parties. 
The changing balance of factional power within old and new political 
structures 
Egypt. Important and wide-ranging change in the domestic balance of 
power has been occurring throughout the Middle East since the start 
of the revolts. In Egypt, in the wake of President Mubarak’s overthrow, 
the internal balance of power amongst political actors initially favoured 
the armed forces, perceived by many Egyptians as the guarantors of 
the revolution. However, it has gradually moved away from the military 
and shifted to the Islamists, even though the armed forces retain 
significant control. Once influential, the police have been increasingly 
marginalised. 
Under Mubarak, Egypt was governed by a presidential system, but 
one with important caveats. Mr. Mubarak, who had risen through the 
ranks of the armed forces, allowed the military to amass significant 
economic interests (equal to 25 percent of gross national product by 
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some accounts) and to maintain its own police force and administration. 
President Mubarak, however, could not take the military’s support for 
granted and consistently had to ensure it followed his instructions. In 
the words of one speaker, it was a “shield better left unused”: when 
the president asked the army for something, he knew that he owed it 
something else in return. Any request for assistance would be perceived 
as an admission of failure on Mr. Mubarak’s part. As a result, he relied 
primarily on the weaker police force, traditionally calling on the army 
only as a last resort.
It is against such power dynamic that tensions grew between the  
civilian government and the army in recent years, as the latter believed 
the president was gradually breaking the pact between them.  
Mr. Mubarak had already tried to weaken the military’s vast economic 
empire. In 2005 and 2007, he also amended the constitution to  
prevent the military from appointing the president and to position his 
own son, Gamal, as his successor, against the army’s wishes. On  
28 January 2011 when the police collapsed under the pressure of 
massive street protests, the army was called in to intervene. The  
military rapidly seized an opportunity to force Mr. Mubarak to resign. 
With the removal of the Mubarak administration, the army was at the 
height of its power, while the police disintegrated. The army thus took 
over the responsibility for organising the transition. In the view of its 
officers, the Egyptians wanted both free elections and changes to 
the nature of relations between state and society. The military initially 
argued that, while it would help facilitate a democratic transition, it was 
up to civilians to figure out how to go about achieving the second goal. 
The military’s relationship with the Islamists rapidly proved challenging. 
Initially, the two sides prepared together a road map which called for 
free elections, a new parliament to draft a new constitution, the  
approval of this constitution by referendum, and a presidential election. 
In June 2011, however, the army changed its mind once it realised 
that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists would gain a demo-
cratic majority and therefore be the chief drafters of the constitution. 
The military tried – and failed – first to write its own constitution, and 
then allowed the old guard from the former ruling party to participate 
in elections, hoping that they had the money and networks to limit 
Islamist victories. These two failed tactics confirmed for many the 
impression that the army was trying to keep power for itself. 
Since the army took over in February 2011, the public has increasingly 
seen the transition as a failure because of the military’s incompetence 
and lack of experience. This perception, however, tends to overlook 
one factor raised by a speaker at the conference: “the army is the only 
Competing Visions of the State
18 
Egyptian institution that functions.” We must also consider the officer 
corps’ mood; however difficult it may be to assess. While non-Islamist 
activists continue to insult and blame the army, many young officers 
are angry with the revolutionaries because they do not appreciate the 
support provided by the military. As a result, young officers tend to 
believe that the army should have been firmer from the beginning. 
There is a growing perception that the army is weak compared with 
the Islamists because the military has had to retreat on several occa-
sions. Now that the Islamists have won a legitimate majority at the 
ballot box, it is even more difficult for the military to stand up to them. 
As a result, the military is now in a much less advantageous position 
than it was in early 2011, despite its control over legitimate violence in 
Egypt, its powerful networks, and its much greater popularity than the 
police.
In the face of swelling protests on Tahrir Square, the police had first 
appeared as President Mubarak’s most important and reliable ally. It 
was heavily involved in settling labour disputes; it had a strong say 
over the state’s control of the religious establishment, and it handled 
important political files for the regime. It had also become increas-
ingly violent and corrupt, and distrusted the military. The police force 
gradually became involved in the repression of jihadist groups. This 
repression in turn nurtured the process of religious radicalisation in the 
1980s and 1990s. The police was eventually perceived as protecting 
solely the interests of the Mubarak family.  It has become a broken 
force since rapidly disintegrating after the initial street protests.  
The breakdown in law and order in Egypt is yet another challenge 
confronting its leaders. 
Power has shifted to a traditional enemy, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which the police has actively repressed since 1948. Police reform will 
inevitably be one of the most pressing challenges facing future civilian 
governments in Cairo. It is not clear how the Brotherhood views this 
issue, although we can be certain that the relationship between  
Islamists and the police will remain one of the most controversial  
issues facing Egypt for years. 
Bahrain. Uprisings are cyclical in Bahraini politics, occurring every 
decade or so. The violence and suddenness of the Arab revolts have 
had serious repercussions for the Bahraini government, widening the 
gap between reformers and conservatives and exacerbating sectarian 
tensions between the Sunni rulers and the mostly Shi’ite population. 
When it became increasingly clear that the government would 
succeed in repressing the popular protests, the balance gradually 
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shifted in favour of the hard-liners, who have rallied around the prime 
minister, and against the reformists, who are led by the crown prince. 
Factionalism in the royal family in Bahrain saw a marked rise after 
2006. Since he became king in 1999, succeeding his father, Hamed 
Bin Issa Al-Khalifa has tried to exercise full power. He has since 
been in a constant battle with the prime minister, his uncle, who has 
occupied the post since 1971 and who, before Al-Khalifa’s ascent to 
the throne, was the most powerful figure in the regime. Competition 
between the monarch and the prime minister became more intense 
after 2006 when a new dynamic emerged as the king, along with his 
reform-minded son and the support of Al-Wefaq, the main Shi’ite  
opposition party, advocated socio-economic and labour market  
reforms despite the opposition of the hard-liners. 
The uprisings of 2011 altered the dynamic that had prevailed since 
2006 and had two main implications. First, royal factionalism is now 
more intense than ever. The crown prince, who had previously been 
a prominent reformist figure in the royal family, has been sidelined 
despite support from the US government. His attempts at establishing 
a dialogue with the opposition in early 2011 were blocked by conser-
vatives, who are backed by Saudi Arabia. Consequently, many in the 
opposition believe that the fate of the uprising was decided in Riyadh. 
There is also increased fragmentation within the opposition as to how 
to deal with the government. Al-Wefaq had different expectations than 
Al-Haq and other, more radical opposition groups. Al-Wefaq sought 
only limited political reforms, such as the appointment of the prime 
minister from the ranks of the opposition, while others (Al-Haq and 
new youth movements) called for full democracy and the creation of  
a republican system. 
Hamas. The internal balance of factional power has also evolved 
within Hamas’ leadership. Those changes are not directly caused by 
the Arab revolts, but they nevertheless have important implications 
for regional politics. Despite six years of hardship and war, control 
over Gaza has gradually transformed Hamas into a considerable 
force. It has circumvented Israel’s restrictions by organising trade 
channels using underground tunnels to Egypt, slowly strengthening 
Gaza. The consolidation of Hamas’ grip over the strip has also 
empowered the leadership based there, at the expense of its external 
leaders, like Khaled Mishal based in Damascus. Hamas’ influence on 
Gaza’s economy especially eroded Mr. Mishal’s ability to influence 
developments from Damascus and hastened his decline.
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Mr. Mishal’s recent tentative reconciliation agreement with Fatah was 
a gamble that, if successful, could have considerably raised his status 
amongst the Palestinians. However, others within the leadership of 
Hamas balked at the deal. The debate appeared to be ideological 
in nature, but it was largely driven by the ongoing power struggle 
within the movement. Faced with mounting opposition, and to avoid 
humiliation, Mr. Mishal announced in early 2012 that he would step 
down. It is too early, however, to write him off. Some in the Arab world 
remain well disposed towards him, and he may have ambitions to 
replace Mahmoud Abbas as leader of the Palestinian Authority. In the 
meantime, Ismael Haniyeh, the Gaza-based Hamas leader, seems to 
be positioning himself to replace Mr. Mishal officially. 
Evolution of the threat environment
Insecurity in post-revolutionary states: Libya, Egypt and the African 
neighbourhood
The post-Qaddafi transition in Libya has resulted in a number of 
threats and challenges, both in terms of short-term security and  
long-term democratisation and state-building. Security presents 
considerable difficulties in Libya, whose revolution was much bloodier 
than those in Egypt or Tunisia and which had no prior political structures 
or institutions. The National Transitional Council (NTC), the interim 
government, has so far failed to establish security throughout the 
country. It needs to integrate the various rebel militias into state  
institutions and to devise plans to deal with the many criminals who 
escaped from prisons during the revolution. To do so, a priority for 
the future government of Libya will be to rebuild security institutions, 
especially the police and armed forces.
State-building in Libya will be very challenging, in particular national 
reconciliation and institution-building. A draft law on transitional justice 
has been submitted to the NTC, but there has been no progress on 
the issue, while efforts to promote reconciliation have been tentative 
at best. The judiciary system is dysfunctional, with for instance over 
7,000 people detained without due process. The NTC is generally 
weak and inefficient; it is at best only poorly and reluctantly committed 
to democratisation, according to one speaker. 
Libya’s instability will continue to have a number of consequences 
for regional security. The most significant risk in the post-Qaddafi 
transition is the fact that various weapons from the Libyan army or 
from the country’s many militias are falling into the wrong hands. 
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Several US, UN and Egyptian officials have argued that Libyan 
weapons, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), have reached 
other countries and that Al Qaeda’s North African affiliate, Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has succeeded in acquiring some 
of these weapons. Reports from Algeria suggest that the extent of 
weapons smuggling from Libya is unprecedented and that as a result 
prices have fallen significantly.
 
SAMs seeping out of Libya represent the most important prolifera-
tion risk. Since 1975, 40 civilian aircrafts have been downed by such 
weapons. It is also known that Al Qaeda has in the past tried to use 
them to bring down a civilian airliner. There were approximately 
20,000 SAMs in Libya before the revolution; of those, 14,000 have 
been destroyed, leaving perhaps 6,000 unaccounted for. To mitigate 
the threat, said a conference speaker, the US has specialists on the 
ground looking for the missing SAMs. 
Libya is also thought to possess about 2,000 tonnes of yellow cake, 
that is, processed uranium ore which is not yet enriched. It also has 
large amounts of mustard gas in sites where security is often lax. In 
contrast with other types of weapons, the proliferation of yellow cake 
and mustard gas is a lesser concern because both materials require 
sophisticated equipment to be used.
 
Libyan instability has implications for Egypt too. Smuggling networks 
have indeed taken advantage of the situation to ship weapons through 
Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula and into the Gaza Strip. SAMs and 
machine guns from Libya are readily available at low prices. This situ-
ation could prove troublesome, given that some Palestinian organisa-
tions have targeted civilian aircraft travelling to and from Israel in the 
past. 
The region faces no shortage of potential security threats. Once a 
relatively stable part of Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, too, is now grow-
ing volatile as a result of the tense relationship between some local 
Bedouins and the central power in Cairo. Because of demands for 
local autonomy and the deteriorating Egyptian-Israeli relations, some 
experts fear Sinai could become a “new Waziristan”, lawless and ac-
cessible to a range of international terrorists. Despite those concerns, 
there are early signs that regional security cooperation is improving. 
For example, the chiefs of staff from several North African and Sahel 
countries, including Mali, Mauritania and Algeria, have recently gath-
ered to establish a counter-AQIM force. Only time, however, will tell 
how effective that force can be.
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Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda’s regional affiliates are now thought to pose a more serious 
threat than the core of the Al Qaeda group itself. Al Qaeda was founded 
in 1988, but did not launch its first attack until 1998. In comparison, 
Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate based in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), was formed in January 2009 and by December of 
the same year it had nearly brought down a Northwest Airlines flight 
landing in Detroit. 
According to one speaker, this situation demonstrates that terrorist 
groups are becoming more threatening and more internationalised 
faster than before. There is some concern that AQAP could take 
advantage of mounting instability in Yemen to supersede “Al Qaeda 
central” in South Asia. AQAP has rapidly demonstrated its remarkable 
resilience and its sense of innovation and daring in a series of  
attempted attacks since 2009. Certain commentators fear Al Qaeda’s 
surprising creativity, for example, AQAP’s possible use of surgically 
implanted improvised explosive devices (SIIEDs) to perpetrate suicide 
attacks. 
While Al Qaeda’s core has suffered significant losses, not the least of 
which was the death of Osama Bin Laden, it remains strong, contrary 
to common wisdom. The broader movement is also strong at the 
periphery, for example, in Iraq, Yemen, Africa and even Syria, where 
a presenter indicated during the conference that the group is already 
beginning to take advantage of political instability. It is also feared  
that Al Qaeda’s message may find new prospects should the  
disenfranchised youth grow disillusioned or impatient with the early 
results of popular democracy.
Geopolitical realignments 
Shifting regional power politics
The Arab revolts have already created a new geopolitical order in the 
Middle East. Amongst the many geopolitical consequences of the 
events of 2011, a central one has been the gradual resumption by 
Egypt of its normal leadership role in the region. Saudi Arabia and the 
other GCC states, for their part, are doing something very unusual for 
them: “They have begun acting like real states,” said a speaker. This 
has been a moment of maturation for them. 
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Israel is off-balance; it does not know how to react now that it is no 
longer the sole democracy in the region and is increasingly surrounded 
by forms of political Islam. External powers, finally, have not been 
major actors in the Arab awakening. The US remains confused about 
the emerging order, while the Europeans have been noticeably absent, 
and Russia has been looking for new entry points into the region. 
Iran has suffered a series of setbacks
It is often said that regional events after 2003 benefitted Iran. The 
removal of two of its traditional rivals, the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, eliminated two checks to the 
expansion of Iranian power. A series of other factors, such as high oil 
prices, the good fortunes of allies such as the Hizballah in Lebanon 
and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, and the petering out of the 
peace process, also converged to improve Iran’s regional position. 
Since early 2011, however, Tehran has seen the consolidation of 
existing trends affect its status negatively, and the emergence of new 
pressures had led to a reversal in Iranian fortunes. The country’s 
soft power, a key element shaping its overall power, has suffered 
a series of blows. Its message of violent resistance to the regional 
order and its model of an Islamic Republic have been overshadowed 
by the neighbouring popular uprisings and their narrative of peaceful 
change and by Turkey’s increasingly successful blending of Islam and 
democracy. 
Tehran is also increasingly isolated diplomatically and economically. 
Its ability to influence events in the Middle East has been marginal, 
and in many cases non-existent. It has not been able to gain 
influence over the region’s rising Islamist parties, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt or, even more frustratingly, the various Shi’a 
opposition movements in Bahrain. 
The emergence of Qatar as a regional power centre
The emergence of Qatar as an influential player is one of the region’s 
recent developments of interest. The Arab awakening appears to have 
accelerated this trend by creating more space for this small, oil-rich 
monarchy’s proactive diplomacy. According to one speaker, so far 
“Qatar has made the right decisions,” but whether it can count on its 
continued good fortunes remains to be seen. 
 
Qatar’s diplomacy has greatly benefitted from the country’s massive 
hydrocarbon resources, which have provided the government with 
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enormous financial assets. To understand Doha’s success, we must 
understand how the factors influencing the current oil and natural gas 
boom differ from those in the 1970s. The GCC states back then re-
cycled their massive revenues through Western financial institutions, 
to the detriment of both domestic and regional development.
Today, they invest much of their funds domestically and regionally, 
mainly in infrastructure and in the financial industry, which has resulted 
in massive inflows of foreign (pan-regional) direct investments. The 
GCC states have also invested in human development initiatives, for 
example, establishing their own universities and attracting international 
schools to establish local branch campuses. There was only one 
university in the GCC in the 1950s; there were three in the 1960s, and 
forty in the 1990s. By 2011, there were 120 universities in the GCC 
countries. Gulf states have also invested in the Levant and North 
Africa. For example, 50 percent and 75 percent of the Egyptian and 
Jordanian stock markets respectively are said to be owned by GCC 
nationals. 
Three comparative advantages set Qatar apart from other GCC 
countries. First is its remarkable social cohesion. The conditions of the 
Shi’a have been generally positive. About 20 to 30 percent of Qataris 
are thought to be Shi’ite and have been well integrated into the social, 
political and economic establishments. Second, Qatar benefits from 
a determined and visionary leadership. The regime is largely non-
ideological, and it is driven by its singular vision to put the country on 
the global map and to have the global powers take it seriously. This is 
in sharp contrast to the situation in Kuwait, for example, whose leader-
ship is fragmented. 
Third, there is also a remarkable level of political apathy amongst 
Qataris, largely because of the robust rentier economy that Qatar  
has created for itself. Social welfare is expansive and takes care 
of individuals from cradle to grave. This has led to the creation of 
enormous per capita wealth, with the average salary at US$92,000 or 
US$345,000 if  non-Qatari citizens are removed from the calculation. 
Three pivotal factors enable Qatar to “punch above its weight” diplo-
matically. First and foremost are the country’s financial reserves. The 
Qatar Investment Authority, which manages the country’s sovereign 
wealth fund, has pursued an active and global investment strategy. 
By some estimates, if Qatar continues to invest at its current pace 
and obtains only a 5 percent rate of return on its investments, it will 
continue to earn US$77 billion annually (excluding its revenues from 
liquefied natural gas, of which it is the largest producer in the world). 
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Many small countries have historically pursued a foreign policy  
described as bandwagoning, whereby they appease, or “bandwagon” 
with, the dominant regional power. This has been Bahrain’s approach 
towards Saudi Arabia. Qatar has instead chosen a hedging strategy, 
by maintaining open lines of communication with everyone. It hosts 
the largest forward US base in the Persian Gulf, yet it also maintains 
warm relations with Iran. As a general rule, Qatar seeks good relations 
with multiple actors, including those with whom it does not always see 
eye to eye.
Finally, Qatar has launched an aggressive branding campaign, project-
ing a unique image of itself around the world through three primary 
methods. Most visible has been Al-Jazeera, the international broad-
caster which has helped Qatar rise to prominence since 1996. Qatar 
has also sought to position itself as a conflict mediator. Although it has 
not had many actual successes in solving conflicts (except in Lebanon 
and Sudan), what matters is that it has managed to appear as a 
regional broker. Finally, Qatar has fostered a number of showcase 
projects, such as Qatar Airways, its world-class Museum of Islamic 
Art, as well as its winning bid to host the football World Cup in 2022. 
Despite its recent successes, the country will likely have to grapple 
with a number of difficulties and potential problems in the near future. 
The first is overreach, which may already be an issue with respect to 
Qatar’s policy in Libya. Qatar has been quite active in the context of 
the international community’s intervention in that country since early 
2011, but its role raises questions about its ability to deal with the  
consequences of events in post-Qaddafi Libya. Similar questions  
may also arise in Syria. The Qatar model, ultimately, is centred on 
one individual: “One heart attack could change the equation,” said 
a speaker. The Qatari emir is savvy, but has health problems. Also, 
Qatar’s decision-making process so far has largely been intuitive, a 
model that cannot be sustained indefinitely.
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Continuity amidst upheaval
Resilience of the old order
An important common thread throughout the conference was the 
assessment that prominent actors who dominated the old political 
order have been fighting hard since early 2011 to retain their positions 
and to maintain the status quo. They are resilient: they are unwilling 
to abandon their privileges and are keen to defend the old order from 
which they benefitted and in which they have important political and 
economic interests. 
Three categories of such actors exist. In the first category, Saudi 
Arabia is actively positioning itself as the leading defender of the 
status quo. There are also those countries that are experiencing, or 
have experienced, the violence of revolution such as Syria, Yemen 
and Tunisia, where powerful actors which dominated the old political 
order are demonstrating their resilience and fighting fiercely to 
protect their vested interests. Third, we may also wish to study those 
countries that have not been swept up by protests to understand 
which factors are responsible for continued stability. 
Saudi Arabia. After an initially confused reaction as protests swelled 
and spread throughout the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has emerged as 
the main conservative power in the region. In Bahrain, for instance, 
Riyadh has aggressively sought to defend the existing, Sunni-led 
government. 
One speaker proposed an analytical framework to understand Saudi 
foreign policy and domestic politics. In terms of foreign policy, Saudi 
Arabia views itself as the leader of the Islamic, Arab and energy 
worlds. Although foreigners may often associate the kingdom with oil, 
its leaders consider Islam and custodianship of the two holiest places 
in Islam (Mecca and Medina) to be the most crucial aspects of their 
identity. The importance of its leadership role in the Arab world is also 
crucial. This role traditionally fell to Egypt, yet Saudi Arabia’s vast 
resources have allowed it to assume this role. In energy terms, Saudi 
Arabia has the world’s largest oil reserves (roughly 24 percent of total 
reserves) and is the world’s largest oil exporter. 
Saudi domestic politics can be pictured as a triangle with the royal 
family at the top, one bottom corner representing the technocratic 
and business classes, and the other bottom corner consisting of the 
conservative religious leadership. The royal family needs the other 
two to maintain its rule, yet the technocrats and the clerics resent 
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each other’s influence. This triangle is therefore in a constant state 
of tension. If the religious leadership gains some advantage, the 
technocratic and commercial class can be expected to fight back, and 
vice versa. 
Saudi Arabia’s initial reaction to the Arab awakening was seen 
to be clumsy and confusing. Riyadh was stunned as the regional 
mood rapidly swung, and the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents 
were overthrown within weeks of each other. Saudi Arabia was 
also dismayed by Washington’s sudden change of heart vis-à-vis 
President Mubarak, from whom the US withdrew its support. The 
Saudi authorities were particularly irritated because when their 
traditional rival, Iran, had its own massive protests in the wake of the 
controversial presidential elections in 2009, the US had refused to 
intervene.
Saudi Arabia believes that changes to the regional political order 
would not be in its interests and as a result seeks to limit further 
revolutionary changes. It was deeply concerned that unrest in Bahrain 
would spread into its Shi’ite-majority Eastern Province. Riyadh, 
which has considerable economic and political influence over its 
tiny neighbour, therefore intervened to isolate the reformist faction 
of Bahrain’s royal family and to provide support to the conservatives 
camp, especially the prime minister, the army chief  and his brother, 
the royal court minister. 
Yemen. The consequences of the Arab awakening in Yemen show 
how dominant actors from the old political order are resilient and 
actively defend a return to the status quo. To understand recent 
developments in Yemen, we must keep in mind some historical 
developments that together explain how the political and economic 
situations had already considerably deteriorated before the Arab 
revolts spread to the country. 
 
Yemen’s history is marred by the separation between North and South 
Yemen from 1967 to 1990. The liberal, republican regime in the north 
was aligned with the West, while the south was the only Marxist republic 
in the Arab world. Unification in 1990 led to the establishment of a 
multi-party system with relatively free elections. Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
who had been president of North Yemen since 1978, was appointed 
President of a unified Yemen and continued to lead the country until 
2011. A war in 1994 between Northern unionists and Southern seces-
sionists was won by the former. The conflict temporarily destroyed the 
Yemeni Socialist Party, which used to dominate the south, and many 
believed that separation from the north was no longer a viable option. 
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There has been, however, a resurgence of separatist ideas in the 
south since 2007. 
Delicately maintained by President Saleh, Yemen’s political balance 
since 1990 had been characterised by the absorption into politics of 
most of the country’s actors, including tribesmen and Islamists. In 
recent years, this pluralistic system was tested as resources were 
increasingly monopolised by Mr. Saleh and his clan, and as repression 
of opposition factions and independent journalists grew fiercer. The 
first decade of the 21st century also witnessed the expansion of three 
localised conflicts involving the government: in the south with the 
secessionists, in the north with the Houthis, who claim to defend Zaidi 
Shi’ism (a minority in the country but a majority in the northern  
highlands), and across Yemen against Islamists linked to Al Qaeda. 
When the Arab revolts reached Yemen in 2011, the country’s politicians 
were therefore already under severe pressure. The main opposition 
parties had unified in 2003 under a common umbrella organisation, 
the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), regrouping the mostly secular Yemeni 
Socialist Party, the northern-based Islah party (consisting mainly of 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, businessmen and tribesmen) 
and a variety of smaller parties.  
The uprising in Yemen started slowly, and the JMP initially appeared 
reluctant to move against the president. A few scattered demonstrations 
were held, but most protest leaders generally supported dialogue with 
the regime. A more important movement slowly emerged in February 
2011, consisting of mainly students who had recently graduated in the 
cities. The turning point for the opposition came on 18 March, when 
regime snipers shot and killed more than fifty protesters, launching a 
wave of defections amongst Mr. Saleh’s allies in the military and the 
bureaucracy. Most important amongst those defections was that of  
Ali Mohsen, a central and controversial senior military officer. His 
defection changed the relationship between the regime and the 
protesters because he had previously been Mr. Saleh’s most trusted 
ally in the armed forces. At the same time, Mr. Mohsen’s role in past 
repression of dissidence made the revolutionary youth uneasy and 
suspicious.
This led to an attempted mediation by Saudi Arabia and the other 
members of the GCC. The proposed deal involved a peaceful transition, 
with Mr. Saleh stepping down in exchange for immunity. The president 
accepted the offer on three occasions, but each time eventually 
changed his mind. Tensions on the streets mounted throughout the 
spring, with street fights escalating between, on the one side, pro- 
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regime military units and tribal militias and, on the other, defected 
army units and tribes allied with the opposition. 
Tensions reached a peak in early June 2011, when an explosion  
inside the presidential mosque severely injured the president and  
injured or killed many of his close advisers. Mr. Saleh subsequently left 
for Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, only to return in September. The 
president later signed the GCC agreement in November, but “continues 
to pull many strings in the country.” Yemen’s vice-president was nomi-
nally put in charge until elections were held in February 2012.
Two important trends marked Yemeni political life in 2011: the rise 
of new political actors and the practices and resilience of traditional 
ones. Amongst the new actors, the revolutionary youth, highly politicised 
and distrusting of traditional parties, have played a central role. Their 
leadership is fragmented, but expresses many of the population’s 
aspirations. 
Three counter-revolutionary processes can be observed at the same 
time. The Islah party now plays a key role in structuring the street 
protests thanks to its mobilisation capacity. Elements within the mili-
tary have sided with the revolutionary youth, which has contributed to 
building a “balance of terror” where both protesters and the regime are 
armed. Finally, the government has been able to keep the internation-
al community’s attention focussed on security and counter terrorism. 
Despite Mr. Saleh’s loss of legitimacy, the international community has 
continued to cooperate with his regime. 
Syria. The old political order in Syria has stubbornly defended the 
status quo in the face of massive street protests, resulting in one 
of the most violent chapters of the Arab revolts. The uprising was 
sparked in March by events in Daraa, a small southwestern city, when 
school children drew graffiti calling for the toppling of the government. 
The regime’s response was to arrest and torture the children, aged 
between 10 and 15. A wave of protests and violent repression 
followed, with every new wave of protests bringing together larger 
numbers and spreading to new areas of the country, and with the 
regime’s response growing increasingly violent. More than 6,000 have 
been killed, while thousands have been internally displaced. 
 
The Syrian revolution has gradually become deadlocked. On one side, 
the Syrian people are unable to force the president, Bashar Al-Assad, 
to step down. The opposition is organising itself,  with the assistance 
of a growing number of troops who have defected from the military. 
On the other side, Mr. Assad, who refuses to compromise, has been 
unable to stop the protest movement from growing, despite his forces’ 
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harsh tactics. He has had support from Russia, which according 
to media reports provides material support like weapons to Syria. 
Moscow also defended Damascus diplomatically at the UN Security 
Council.
Jordan. The old order is proving resilient in Jordan, although it is 
coming under strain. The traditional challenge for the monarchy  
has been to balance the two main segments of Jordanian society,  
Palestinians and indigenous Jordanians, known as East Bankers. 
The fragile balance of interests has become increasingly difficult to 
maintain as protests have spread throughout the country, even if they 
remain small and under control. Both sides want change but do not 
agree on either means or ends: East Bankers want empowerment, 
while Palestinians seek universal suffrage. 
Abdullah II is generally seen as a weak and ineffective king, especially 
compared with his father, Hussein. He has addressed demands for 
change by promising reforms but has not followed up with concrete 
actions. His grip on power appears uncertain at times, and he has 
changed his personnel frequently, including prime ministers three 
times in one year. In October 2011, he replaced an East Banker with a 
former judge from the International Criminal Court, who is believed to 
favour reform.
The king has increasingly come under attack from both constituencies. 
The former charge that the monarch is progressively shifting his 
power base from the security forces (dominated by the East Bankers) 
to the business community (where the Palestinians predominate). For 
the first time, East Bankers are openly criticising the sovereign and 
questioning the legitimacy of Hashemite rule. Abdullah II faces further 
criticism for allegedly favouring Palestinians because his wife is 
Palestinian. The primary target of the Palestinians’ anger, on the other 
hand, is the repressive security and intelligence apparatus, accused of 
trying to “steal” the Arab awakening. 
Jordan, in short, has not been swept away by the Arab revolts but 
remains in a state of high tension in which more unrest is likely. The 
general impression in the country is that the social contract between 
East Bankers and Palestinians, that is, the “glue” holding the country 
together for decades, is no longer sustainable. The regime will not 
be able to hold the people at bay indefinitely with handouts and jobs, 
because in doing so the king will only expand an already bloated 
bureaucracy and exacerbate the country’s fiscal crisis. 
 
Tunisia. The cleanest and sharpest break with the old political order 
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has perhaps occurred in Tunisia. Yet even there elements of the old 
regime remain in place. In particular, former President Ben Ali’s security 
apparatus remains largely unchanged. The new regime decided in 
March 2011 to dissolve the police, but many former members of the 
force were simply recycled within the system. Torture is still occurring. 
To make matters worse, the economic problems that plagued the old 
order have worsened as the revolution caused the economy to slow 
down in 2011. A large percentage of Tunisians are still jobless, and the 
new government will be hard pressed to honour its promises of social 
justice and of economic empowerment to the disenfranchised population 
in the south. 
Algeria and Morocco. Algeria and Morocco have distinguished 
themselves from their North African neighbours by their relative 
calm, which has surprised many observers. Studying their situation 
sheds a useful light on and explains why revolts have not engulfed 
the two countries and why the existing political structures endure. 
Three general factors explain the uniqueness of Algeria and Morocco 
today. First, as early as the 1990s both countries liberalised large 
parts of their social life. As a result, their citizens are less fearful of 
expressing their opinions, in sharp contrast to the prevailing conditions 
in Tunisia and Libya before 2011. Second, neither country has a 
dominant, emblematic leader against whom popular resentment can 
be channelled easily. Finally, political parties and unions did not join 
protesters on the streets, but instead have remained partners of the 
government. 
 
In the wake of a failed political transition and interrupted elections, 
Algeria slid into a bloody civil war in 1991. When pondering the events 
of 2011, many Algerians believe that “they have already travelled this 
road” and that their own revolution occurred between 1988 and 1990. 
They obtained elections, freedom of the press and a number of other 
rights, although not complete democracy. Instead, from the ruins of 
the civil war emerged a pluralised authoritarian system dominated by 
the army. 
Since the uprisings erupted in the region, three main factors have 
prevented the occurrence of large protests in Algeria: the fragmentation 
of power under the current system, the hydrocarbon rent and the  
overwhelming focus of political parties and unions on salary negotiations. 
First, the atomisation of power structures in Algeria has prevented the 
eruption of resentment against a specific figure within the regime, as 
occurred, for example, against Mubarak or Ben Ali. Power in Algeria is 
distributed: a military oligarchy may well dominate, but it has delegated 
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many responsibilities to parties and technocrats. 
Second, Algeria has used its considerable hydrocarbon rent to buy 
stability, massively investing in a wide spectrum of social programs. 
This has not bought the regime social harmony but has considerably 
reduced social and economic inequality, which was an important  
factor driving protests elsewhere in the region. The third factor that 
has contributed to stability and the perpetuation of the old order has 
been the fact that political parties and labour unions, powerful actors 
in the country, have in recent years focussed their energies on  
obtaining salary increases, not on challenging the regime. 
In Morocco, popular grievances centred on the “20th of February” 
movement, which called for an end to the monarchy’s hegemony over 
the country’s domestic politics. Two main factors, however, explain  
the resilience of the monarchy: its capacity to prevent conflict by  
integrating its rivals into the political system, and the restraint exercised 
by police forces when faced with smaller street protests. 
Historically, the Moroccan monarchy has successfully co-opted its 
rivals and critics by integrating them into the political system, as it did 
in the 1990s with the main opposition movement, the Socialist Party. 
In recent years, it has used the same approach with a new challenger, 
the Islamist movement which has created the Party for Justice and 
Development (PJD). The PJD now leads the elected government and 
actively participates in the country’s governance, which has led to a 
gradual convergence of its interests with those of the king. 
The regime has also learned from the experiences of its neighbours 
that police brutality only adds fuel to the fire of popular frustrations. As 
a result, Moroccan police forces have generally behaved with greater 
restraint than those in Tunisia for example. The one glaring exception 
to this generally successful effort has been the security apparatus’  
response to the Marrakesh bombing that killed seventeen people in 
April 2011. According to one speaker, this response displayed the 
security sector’s dysfunction. 
Unlike Algeria, Morocco which has no oil reserves cannot easily 
respond to its many economic and social fault lines through massive 
financial investments and social programs. Inequalities therefore 
remain high, and current efforts to reduce poverty and keep a lid on 
the prices of basic goods are creating mounting structural budgetary 
deficits. The evolution of inequalities and of the government’s fiscal 
standing will determine the future stability of Morocco. 
Continuity in the threat environment
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Al Qaeda is still strong
Al Qaeda’s obituary has been written several times in the past  
decade, and given the Middle East’s “popular liberation,” this view 
may seem more compelling than ever. Evidence uncovered in  
Osama Bin Laden’s home after his death revealed his concern that 
Al Qaeda was losing the struggle for the hearts and minds of the  
Arab world. Some have even wondered whether the Arab awakening 
is rendering Al Qaeda irrelevant. 
Caution is needed, however, as Al Qaeda remains powerful in many 
ways. It may have suffered a series of blows over the past three 
years, but it has been able to accomplish the impossible by expanding 
significantly during this period: there were seven Al Qaeda networks in 
2008, and twelve by early 2012. Over time, Al Qaeda has succeeded 
in transforming itself from a monolithic movement into a networked 
transnational movement, despite the punishment imposed by the US. 
Now, multiple networks with unique idiosyncratic ideologies present 
individual challenges.  
Conventional wisdom on Al Qaeda has also proven wrong in the past. 
It was previously believed to be a bottom-up threat and that command 
structures did not matter. The Mumbai attacks and the attempt to blow 
up a vehicle in Times Square demonstrated that this view was wrong. 
It was also widely thought that Osama Bin Laden as a figurehead 
played a limited role and was isolated from his sympathisers and  
supporters. However, documents discovered after the raid that killed 
him suggest that this was also wrong. In short, a speaker warned 
that we must be cautious about received ideas about Al Qaeda: the 
organisation remains strong indeed, especially in Pakistan, Somalia, 
Iraq and Yemen. 
Geopolitical constants  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a festering wound for many  
in the region
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not served as a mobilising issue 
to bring people to the streets during the Arab awakening. A number 
of speakers agreed, however, that it risks “coming back with a 
vengeance” and may grow in importance as the Arab world becomes 
more democratic and more responsive to the will of the people, 
especially because a resolution to the conflict is not in sight and Arab 
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populations are generally unfavourable to Israel. 
According to one speaker, a breakthrough in the Middle East peace 
process is unlikely in 2012. In his view, changing public and coalition 
dynamics, as well as changing perceptions of regional dynamics in 
Israel, all suggest that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 
will continue. 
A recent poll to which the speaker referred found that 58 percent of 
Israelis support former US President Bill Clinton’s proposed two-state 
solution, while only 38 percent oppose it. In an apparent paradox, 
however, 79 percent thought there would be no peace in the coming 
years, given that a strong majority in Israel believe most Palestin-
ians oppose a two-state solution. A variety of factors have led to the 
entrenchment of this perception, including the second intifada (2000-
2004), Hamas’ rejection of Israel, and the prevailing conviction that  
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000 only 
made Israel more vulnerable to rocket attacks. These and other  
factors have convinced many Israelis that no matter what land they 
yield, the Palestinians will never accept Israel as a nation. 
Coalition dynamics in Israel depend on the changing demographics in 
the country. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s coalition is made 
up of traditional “outsiders,” including Sephardic Jews, Jews of Middle 
Eastern origin, Russian immigrants and orthodox and ultra-orthodox 
Jews. Crucially, most of the governing coalition’s members are either 
opposed to or reluctant to see Israel make progress in the peace pro-
cess with the Palestinians. This coalition has remained solid, recently 
passing the state’s two-year budget. Moreover, each party for its own 
reasons does not want to see the coalition dismantled, whereas the 
opposition is too fragmented to mount a serious challenge. 
Changing regional dynamics in the uncertain context of the Arab  
revolts will probably make it harder for Israel to fully commit to the 
peace process. In the meantime, Mr. Netanyahu has been hunkering 
down, hesitating to make concessions as long as Israel’s security  
environment is both deteriorating and unpredictable. As a consequence, 
the issue of Iran and its nuclear program has been his government’s 
strategic priority. 
The Sunni-Shi’a tensions continue
Sectarian tensions have not played a determining role in shaping the 
Arab awakening. A minority of speakers mentioned them throughout 
the event, and mostly in the context of the larger geopolitical rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. One exception, however, is Bahrain, 
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where the Sunni-Shi’a divide was pronounced before the uprisings 
and has widened since. This is of particular concern to Saudi Arabia, 
as it has traditionally feared Iranian influence amongst both its own 
Shi’ite-majority Eastern Province and the Shi’a of Bahrain. It also fears 
that, if the Shi’a of Bahrain overthrow their government (or come close 
to it), a domino effect would spread to the kingdom’s Shi’ite population.
Sectarianism in Bahrain, traditionally a tolerant country where religious 
freedom has not been an issue, has reached unprecedented levels. 
Yet since the outbreak of the protests, anti-Shi’a statements have 
regularly been expressed by the royal family. In the month of May 
2011 alone, forty religious Shi’ite sites were destroyed in unprecedented 
acts which were sponsored by the government. There is also rising 
resentment amongst Sunni against the Shi’a, and some Sunni- 
organised groups now claim that the regime is too soft on the Shi’a. 
Ongoing uncertainties 
An uncertain political order 
Unfulfilled expectations and aspirations will arise, with unpredictable 
consequences
The Arab awakening will inevitably produce some losers and fan 
disappointment. In many countries where regimes have collapsed, 
popular expectations of social, economic and political empowerment 
are very high, but it is a virtual certainty that many of the underlying 
aspirations will go unfulfilled in the near future. In countries where 
prolonged instability is likely, such as Yemen and Syria, frustrated 
young men might be tempted to turn to violence. 
One of Al Qaeda’s traditional audiences has been disenfranchised 
youth and opportunities may open up for the terrorist movement to 
tap into new reservoirs of recruits. Although Al Qaeda is not a political 
party, it has historically sought to reach out to disillusioned members 
of legitimate political parties. Whether it succeeds in doing so could 
well be one of the main factors of its continuing relevance. 
What are the intentions of emerging actors?
A wide variety of new actors have come to the forefront of the political 
scene throughout the Middle East, while existing actors, such as 
the armed forces in Egypt, have seen their role and status change 
considerably. In many cases, however, the intentions of those actors 
are unclear and poorly understood.
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The events of 2011 have shown the central role of armed forces 
in determining the prospects of any government’s survival. Three 
patterns can be identified. In Egypt and Tunisia, the military decided 
that it was in its best interest to distance itself from the ruling clan.  
The armed forces were able to act as an arbiter of the political 
process, because there was a unified and professional chain of 
command that could both make this decision and implement it. In 
Libya and Yemen, the military was not unified and split along regional 
and tribal lines once it came under pressure, with violent outcomes. 
In Bahrain, the military is a praetorian guard that is loyal to the ruling 
clan. It was therefore able to repress street protests.
The armed forces are central actors throughout the region, and yet 
much remains unknown or poorly understood about their intentions 
and world views. They are perhaps the most important determinant of 
future stability in a number of countries. Should serious protests erupt 
in Jordan or Iraq, for example, how would the army react? Or how far 
would the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps be willing to defend the 
status quo in Iran?
The case of the SCAF in Egypt is particularly important. A previous 
assumption had been that the Egyptian military would not tolerate 
more than a token number of Islamists in Egyptian politics. This has 
been proven wrong, even if the future intentions of the high command 
regarding the Muslim Brotherhood remain unclear. How much will the 
SCAF tolerate its growing influence? The answer to this question is 
central to the evolution of the internal balance of power in Egypt. This, 
in turn, will largely shape the future political order not only in Egypt, 
but also the evolution of political Islam in the region. Egypt’s future 
relations with Israel and the United States will in part be shaped by 
these dynamics. 
An uncertain future threat environment
Splinter groups
Many Islamist groups are in the process of joining the political 
mainstream. As they gradually come to accept the rules of the game, 
however, radical elements within their organisations may refuse to 
renounce violence and choose to break away. These disgruntled 
splinter groups could pose a security threat and act as spoilers, for 
example in Egypt or in Libya, where a variety of Islamist groups 
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are gradually becoming a part of the political process. Further 
uncertainties remain in this respect: to what extent will such splinter 
groups form? If they do, will they be able to impede political progress, 
or will they be condemned to the sidelines, succeeding only in 
becoming mere annoyances?
Al Qaeda
A critical but unknown element arising from the Arab awakening 
concerns the prospects for Al Qaeda. Will its message of violent 
change be undermined by the rhetoric of a peaceful one? How will 
AQAP, in recent years the network’s most dynamic franchise, evolve? 
One speaker proposed a number of guiding questions about the future 
of Al Qaeda. 
We do not know how the ongoing fragmentation of the jihadist  
movement will play out. How will the threat evolve as more independent 
terrorist organisations develop? The Al Qaeda core’s capabilities have 
been diminished, but smaller and more fragmented groups will present 
new and very profound intelligence challenges. They will not have the 
same modus operandi and will therefore be more difficult to identify, 
anticipate and thwart. Dissident republican extremists in Northern 
Ireland, for example, have presented significant challenges to counter 
terrorism there. According to one speaker, Indonesian intelligence 
services would make the same argument regarding their dealings with 
emerging militias. 
There is also much uncertainty surrounding the Syria-Jordan-Iraq 
“triangle”. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria would have much 
more serious regional consequences than the fall of Colonel Qaddafi 
did in Libya. The stockpiles of weapons in Syria, which include biological 
weapons, completely eclipse those of Libya. There is also some  
concern that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) could benefit from the chaos in 
Syria to expand its reach to both Syria and Jordan. 
Another major unknown concerns the continued deterioration of 
US-Pakistan relations and of the domestic situation in Pakistan, and 
whether either one of those factors could give Al Qaeda an opportunity 
to regroup and re-organise. It is difficult to predict whether Ayman  
Al-Zawahiri, who replaced Osama Bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda, 
will be a strong leader. Only a few years ago, few would have predicted 
that Mr. Al-Zawahiri would become such a leader, yet he has shown 
that he is a strong survivor who has been present at every political 
juncture for Al Qaeda.
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Finally, it remains unclear how Al Qaeda and the jihadist movement  
as a whole will attempt to harness successfully the same social  
networking tools that proved so valuable in the context of the Arab 
popular revolts. This may seem far-fetched, yet ten years ago many 
observers dismissed the Taliban as technologically illiterate. Today, 
the movement is active on Twitter and relies on a slick media relations 
arm. Al-Sabah, Al Qaeda’s own media arm, has recently begun using 
social networking with its own Twitter feed. 
The future of “lone wolf” threats is uncertain
An important shift in Al Qaeda’s approach in recent years has been its 
support for “lone wolf” tactics. Al Qaeda has discouraged Western  
volunteers from going abroad for training, and rather encouraged 
them to carry out terror attacks in the West itself. This, to some extent, 
reflects the strategy of leaderless jihad pioneered by Abu Musab  
Al-Suri, one of Al Qaeda’s chief thinkers. 
The Al-Suri strategy, however, has generally proven unsuccessful as 
Al Qaeda’s success rate has been relatively low. According to one 
speaker, leaderless jihad has been a failure for a variety of reasons. 
Jihad is in part a social venture; individuals therefore tend to lose 
interest when they find themselves acting alone. In other words, 
potential jihadists are motivated to sign up by an overwhelming sense 
of community and acting as a lone wolf does not satisfy this principle. 
Lone wolves also do not receive much formal training: they have no 
combat experience and often lack discipline and supervision. That is 
why their attacks often fail and, when they succeed, do so only partly. 
For Western jihadist sympathisers, the question now is whether 
Al Qaeda is ready formally to officially abandon the Al-Suri model of 
leaderless jihad and go back to its traditional approach involving travel 
and training abroad. Yemen is the most attractive front in this regard 
because it harbours a strong Al Qaeda local franchise, AQAP, and 
prolonged instability in the country has obvious appeal to foreign  
fighters. AQAP has recently actively called for Western recruits to  
join the jihad overseas through its English-language outreach  
activities on the Internet. 
Although it appears that the Al Qaeda leadership remains committed 
to the Al-Suri model for now, it could eventually choose to again focus 
on the foreign-fighter model given the limited successes that lone  
wolf attacks have had. Many lone wolf candidates might be willing to 
undergo training abroad. The revival of Al Qaeda’s networks in the 
West will be important if it is to survive. 
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Geopolitical uncertainties
An uncertain business environment
A speaker addressed the challenges faced by businesses, especially 
in the energy sector, given the geopolitical changes in the Middle 
East. Although the future evolution of the business environment in the 
region is marked by uncertainty, he stressed that such challenges are 
more manageable than is commonly believed. Until 2011, the Middle 
East was seen as a fairly stable environment because of access: if 
one could access the right people, business interests were secure. 
The region was generally viewed as a low-risk/high-yield one. The 
Arab awakening, however, has turned it into a high-risk/high-yield 
area. Consequently, some businesses may leave the region, but  
opportunities for others will open up. 
Every country in the Middle East has been affected differently by the 
turmoil. Jordan receives most of its natural gas from Egypt, but the 
main pipeline is the target of repeated attacks. To find alternative 
sources for the country’s gas supply therefore becomes a strategic 
decision for Amman. A variety of options, including Qatar, Iraq and 
Israel, have been considered. There are also major uncertainties 
about Algeria. About 15 percent of Europe’s natural gas is imported 
from Algeria, all of which transits through a single point. A local supply 
pipeline near the terminal was blown up in late 2011. This represents 
a significant vulnerability for Europe. 
Because of economic growth is indispensable to bringing stability to 
the region, it is important to understand how previous investments 
were linked to pre-revolutionary circumstances. In Egypt, for example, 
a major gas deal with Israel was closely tied to the Mubarak family 
and its closest business partners, and in general to the regime’s stra-
tegic vision of its relations with Israel. Since they forced Mr. Mubarak 
from power, the armed forces have been unwilling to defend the deal, 
raising questions about the future gas trade between the two countries. 
In this context, a three-question framework can help analysts under-
stand the evolution of the business environment in states where the 
old order has been overthrown or shaken:
•	 How were investments tied to deposed elites and how much 
did they epitomise those elites? 
•	 What investments are linked to the military?
•	 What investments are so profoundly tied to that nation’s  
interests that no regime change will affect them?
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The future of US influence in the Middle East and consequences  
of the Arab revolts for Canada
The future of US influence in the region remains a fundamental  
question to which there is no unanimous answer. In the words of  
one speaker, on some aspects the US has benefitted from the Arab 
awakening, while it has not in others. Throughout the conference, a 
number of speakers argued that US influence in the region was  
probably already in decline prior to 2011. Whether this decline will 
continue, accelerate or be reversed in the future, however, remains 
unclear. 
It is likely that US hard power in the Middle East has declined, while 
the jury is still out on its capacity to exercise soft power. A more 
definitive assessment will depend on how US domestic politics play 
out in 2012 and on how the US will be able to restore the influence 
that President Barack Obama attempted to expand and use at the 
beginning of his administration. Regional perceptions of US policies, 
for their part, will largely depend on what the US does and not what 
it says. What the US has done so far through this period of upheaval 
has been positive for many as it has been supportive of some of the 
revolutions (for example, Libya and Syria), but not in other instances 
(Bahrain). 
According to one speaker, US foreign policy is entering an era of 
volatility and will not be able to escape the consequences of global 
financial instability. In the Middle East, the US seems to have been 
reduced to the status of spectator and can no longer initiate or make 
regional policy. It remains to be seen if the “leadership from behind” 
doctrine and the intervention in Libya will provide viable models of 
influence in the future.
Interestingly, a recent poll of academics conducted by Foreign Policy 
magazine found that 30 percent believe that the Middle East is of  
strategic importance to the US today, but only 8 percent believe that 
this will still be the case by 2032. Even more strikingly, only 6 percent 
of policymakers believe that the region will be of strategic importance 
by that time.1 In addition, 60 percent of academics and policymakers 
supported NATO’s intervention in Libya, but, crucially for the future, 
very large majorities did not support  armed intervention in South 
Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Iran or Pakistan.
 
1 Paul C. Avery, Michael C. Desk, James D. Long, Daniel Malinda, Susan Peterson and  
Michael J. Tierney, “The Ivory Tower: How IR Scholars See the World,” Foreign Policy,  
January/February 2012 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/the_ivory_tower?page=full).
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In the short- to medium-term, the US will have to grapple with a 
number of complex issues, including changing alliances. Washington 
was once a close ally of Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Now 
every one of those relationships is in trouble, even though the nature 
of these ties differs significantly. A country that should be watched 
closely is Saudi Arabia because of US dependence on oil. The rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is another cause for concern, as Saudi 
authorities expect and need US backing. 
Another major potential “game changer” is the Iranian nuclear  
conundrum. It is possible that Iran could become a nuclear state in  
the coming years, an outcome which ultimately will be determined 
mostly by internal Iranian politics, said a speaker. There were missed 
opportunities between the US and Iran in 2003 and 2009, when Iran 
proposed negotiations with the US on all outstanding bilateral issues 
and when a deal to process low enrichment uranium outside of Iran 
was discussed. Such opportunities might not come around again. 
Even though the speaker assessed that Washington does not want 
another Middle Eastern war, tensions are such that small missteps 
could well provoke conflict between the two rivals. One positive  
development for the US on this front has been Iran’s declining status 
as a source of inspiration for the masses throughout the region.  
It increasingly looks like just another autocracy. 
The Israeli-Palestinian front will also raise a number of challenges 
for US policy in the Middle East in the coming months and years. It 
is doubtful that some of the opportunities of the past years will arise 
again. In fact, the government of Barak Obama has so far mostly 
demonstrated the limits, as opposed to the extent, of the influence 
the US can wield in terms of the conflict. In this context, the failure to 
implement the two-state solution will further exacerbate Washington’s 
regional problems. 
 US experiences in Iraq and more recently in Libya raise the question 
of future US military interventions in the Middle East. The war in Iraq 
has largely destroyed the country’s enthusiasm for massive democ-
ratisation projects. President Obama’s approach towards the region 
is in part a formal rejection of any form of democratisation by armed 
intervention. The intervention in Libya, however, offers a different 
model, merging the responsibility-to-protect principle with a campaign 
squarely aiming for regime change. Contrary to some expectations 
that NATO would fail, the intervention was largely successful. US  
foreign policy has not suffered moreover and not a single US soldier 
was killed in the process. According to the presenter, however, this 
model is probably not appropriate for bringing an end to the turmoil  
in Syria. 
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The Arab awakening will inevitably have an impact on Canada and 
its interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Canada may have 
a limited ability to influence outcomes in the region, but it will face a 
number of challenges as it learns how to navigate the new regional 
political and social orders. The region’s expected volatility may  
require future interventions with allied countries, and the possibility  
of multiplying ungoverned spaces may create significantly risks 
of heightened religious extremism. Such uncertainty requires that 
Canada’s knowledge of the region’s political and social developments 
be well maintained.
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A conference of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 
collaboration with the International Research Development Centre (IDRC)
19-20 January 2012 – 1941 Ogilvie Road, Ottawa, Canada
Day One
8.30 – 8.45  Welcome, structure and objectives of  
   the conference
  
8.45 – 9.00  Opening remarks
9.00 – 10.45 Module 1 – The Giant Leading the Way? 
Politics, security and development in Egypt
•	 Interpreting the elections and 
understanding political Islam in Egypt 
today
•	 The changing role of the military 
domestically and regionally, and 
challenges for the security apparatus
•	 A Place Under the Sun? Youth role and 
influence in Egypt’s new politics
10.45 – 11.00  Break
11.00 – 12.30  Module 2—Focus on the Arabian Peninsula
•	 In Praise of No Change: Saudi Arabia’s 
reaction to the revolts, update on 
tensions in the country and future 
stability
•	 On the Fault Line: Bahrain as a 
microcosm of Sunni-Shia relations
•	 Yemen: Building New Political 
Equilibriums
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12.30 – 13.30  Lunch
13.30 – 15.00  Module 3—Focus on the Maghreb
•	 Looking for Inspiration: What lessons 
to draw from Tunisia’s experience
•	 Morocco and Algeria
•	 State of Play: Libya
15.00 – 15.15  Break
15.15 – 16.30  Module 4—Focus on the Mashreq
•	 A Troubled Ally? Progress of Jordan’s 
reforms, changing domestic political 
forces and the country’s long-term 
view of regional security
•	 Lion Hunt: The state of Syria’s uprising 
and its regional implications
16.30 – 17.15 On-stage discussion: Israeli-Palestinian 
relations and influence of the conflict on 
ideology and politics in the Middle East
•	 Israel: domestic obstacles to resolution 
of the conflict
•	 Gaza and the West Bank: the shifting 




8.45 – 9.00  Introduction of the second day’s programme
9.00 – 10.45 Module 5—Political Violence and Terrorism: 
Security dimensions of the Arab revolts
•	 Wither the Appeal? Al-Qaida after the 
revolts
•	 How should western societies expect 
the threat of radicalisation to evolve? 
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•	 Libyan Excesses: The risks and 
implications of failed states in the 
Middle East in the wake of the revolts
10.45 – 11.00  Break
11.00 – 12.00  Keynote address: The Future of Political   
 Islam 
12.00 – 13.00  Lunch
13.00 – 14.45 Module 6—Power Play: The evolving 
geopolitics of the Middle East
•	 Re-ordering the Blocks: Evolution of 
the region’s geopolitics
•	 Qatar: the emergence of a new 
regional power centre
•	 In Practice: Are (energy and other) 
investments into the region secure?
14.45 – 15.00  Break
15.00 – 16.15  Module 7: Implications for Canada and the   
   United States
16.15 – 16.30  Summary
16.30 – 16.45  Concluding remarks
16.45   Adjourn
Competing Visions of the State
46 
Annex B
Academic Outreach at CSIS
Intelligence in a shifting world
It has become a truism to say that the world today is changing at 
an ever faster pace. Analysts, commentators, researchers and 
citizens from all backgrounds—in and outside government—may 
well recognise the value of this cliché, but most are only beginning to 
appreciate the very tangible implications of what otherwise remains an 
abstract statement. 
The global security environment, which refers to the various threats 
to geopolitical, regional and national stability and prosperity, has 
changed profoundly since the fall of Communism, marking the end 
of a bipolar world organised around the ambitions of, and military 
tensions between, the United States and the former USSR. Quickly 
dispelling the tempting end of history theory of the 1990s, the 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States, as well as subsequent events of 
a related nature in different countries, have since further affected our 
understanding of security.
Globalisation, the rapid development of technology and the associated 
sophistication of information and communications have influenced 
the work and nature of governments, including intelligence services. 
In addition to traditional state-to-state conflict, there now exist a wide 
array of security challenges that cross national boundaries, involve 
non-state actors and sometimes even non-human factors. Those 
range from terrorism, illicit networks and global diseases to energy 
security, international competition for resources, and the security 
consequences of a deteriorating natural environment globally. The 
elements of national and global security have therefore grown more 
complex and increasingly interdependent.
What we do
It is to understand those current and emerging issues that CSIS 
launched, in September 2008, its academic outreach program. 
By drawing regularly on knowledge from experts and taking a 
multidisciplinary, collaborative approach in doing so, the Service 
plays an active role in fostering a contextual understanding of security 
issues for the benefit of its own experts, as well as the researchers 
and specialists we engage. Our activities aim to shed light on current 
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security issues, to develop a long-term view of various security trends 
and problems, to challenge our own assumptions and cultural bias, as 
well as to sharpen our research and analytical capacities.
To do so, we aim to:
•	 tap into networks of experts from various disciplines and 
sectors, including government, think-tanks, research 
institutes, universities, private business and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Canada and abroad. 
Where those networks do not exist, we may create them in 
partnership with various organisations;
•	 stimulate the study of issues related to Canadian security 
and the country’s security and intelligence apparatus, while 
contributing to an informed public discussion about the 
history, function and future of intelligence in Canada.
The Service’s academic outreach program resorts to a number of 
vehicles. It supports, designs, plans and/or hosts several activities, 
including conferences, seminars, presentations and round-table 
discussions. It also contributes actively to the development of the 
Global Futures Forum, a multinational security and intelligence 
community which it has supported since 2005.
While the academic outreach program does not take positions on 
particular issues, the results of some of its activities are released on 
the CSIS web site (www.csis-scrs.gc.ca). By publicising the ideas 
emerging from its activities, the program seeks to stimulate debate 
and encourage the flow of views and perspectives between the 
Service, organisations and individual thinkers.
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